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On stochastic imitation dynamics in large-scale networks
Lorenzo Zino, Giacomo Como, and Fabio Fagnani
Abstract—We consider a broad class of stochastic imitation
dynamics over networks, encompassing several well known
learning models such as the replicator dynamics. In the consid-
ered models, players have no global information about the game
structure: they only know their own current utility and the
one of neighbor players contacted through pairwise interactions
in a network. In response to this information, players update
their state according to some stochastic rules. For potential
population games and complete interaction networks, we prove
convergence and long-lasting permanence close to the evolution-
ary stable strategies of the game. These results refine and extend
the ones known for deterministic imitation dynamics as they
account for new emerging behaviors including meta-stability
of the equilibria. Finally, we discuss extensions of our results
beyond the fully mixed case, studying imitation dynamics where
agents interact on complex communication networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
This work is concerned with the analysis of stochastic
imitation dynamics for potential population games in large-
scale networks. Imitation dynamics belong to the broader
class of learning processes and are used to model the
evolution of behaviors and strategies in social and biological
systems [1], [2], [3]. In contrast to most of the other learning
dynamics such as best response and its noisy versions [4], [5]
or logit learning [6], imitation dynamics require very little
information about the game and its structure to be known by
the players: each player only has to know his/her own current
utility and to be able to observe the one of some of her/his
fellow players. The strength of imitation dynamics models
relies, thus, in their very limited assumptions, which allow
for applying them to many real world situations, in which
players may not even be aware of all the possible actions
that can be played.
Imitation dynamics are based on interactions between
individuals in the population. By contacting another player,
an individual gets aware of a new action (the one played
by the contacted player) and of its utility. Then the player
may revise his/her own action using this information, in a
stochastic fashion, in order to increase his/her utility. In this
work, we provide analytical results for fully mixed popula-
tions, where all the possible pairs of individuals are allowed
to interact. Numerical simulations suggest the possibility to
extend our results to more general cases.
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Stochastic learning dynamics have been analyzed in the
literature from different points of view. On the one hand,
for models in which more information of the game structure
is assumed (e.g., noisy best response, logit learning), the
evolution of the strategies in the population and its asymp-
totic behavior have been analyzed [7], [8], [9], [10], where
conditions for convergence close to Nash equilibria (NE) and
estimates of the convergence time have been determined. On
the other hand, models assuming little information and based
on pairwise contacts have been mostly tackled by considering
their deterministic counterparts. Available result in this area,
dealing with local stability, can be found in [11], [12],
[13], [14], [15]. Recently, we proposed an analysis of the
global stability for the relevant class of potential population
games in [16]. Considerations of the behavior of stochastic
dynamics can be found in [4], [17], however, the results in
the literature are mostly limited to some specific dynamics,
and to their applications for some specific classes of games,
e.g., 2-action games with linear reward [17].
This work contributes to extend the understanding of
imitation dynamics. For the special and relevant class of
potential games, we prove convergence and long-lasting
permanence close to the set of evolutionary stable strategies
(ESS) of the (continuous) sub-game restricted to the support
of the initial population configuration. This result refines and
extends what is known for deterministic imitation dynamics
[16], for which convergence close to the NE have been
proven. Hence, the study of the stochastic process deepens
the knowledge of the learning dynamics, allowing for the
analysis of some interesting phenomena that are not captured
by deterministic imitation dynamics models.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we intro-
duce potential population games. In Section III we present
the family of the stochastic imitation dynamics studied in
this paper, we briefly recall the main results known in the
deterministic approach to this dynamics, and we propose an
example showing a relevant phenomenon that is not caught
by the deterministic approach. The main contributions of
this paper are the results on the long-run behavior of the
stochastic imitation dynamics, which are presented in Section
IV. Then, in Section V we discuss extensions of our results
beyond the fully mixed case presenting some numerical
simulations in cases where the players communicate on
a complex networks of interactions. Finally, Section VI
concludes the work and presents future works.
II. POTENTIAL POPULATION GAMES
In this work, we deal with population games whereby
the reward for playing a given action depends only on the
empirical frequency of the actions played in the population.
In order to formally define this class of games, we introduce
the following notions.
Let A be a finite set of actions with |A| = m and
V = {1, . . . , n} a finite set of players (agents). Let us define
the configuration of the system as a vector y ∈ An, where
yv = i means that node v ∈ V plays action i ∈ A. For
large scale systems, i.e., as n grows large, the size of the
configuration space grows exponentially in n making its
analysis almost unfeasible. This issue is addressed in the
following, by defining a lower dimensional observable on
the system: the type.
We let X be the unitary simplex of continuous probability
vectors over A, i.e.,
X =
{
x ∈ RA+ :
∑
i∈A
xi = 1
}
,
(1)
and, denoting the set Sn := {0, 1/n, . . . , 1}, we let X (n) =
X ∩ SAn be its discrete counterpart. Vertices of the simplex
are denoted as δ(i), i ∈ A.
The type of the system is the m-dimensional vector
x ∈ X (n), whose i-th component xi counts the fraction of
individuals playing action i in the configuration of the system
y. Given a type of the system x, its support suppx is the
subset of actions played by at least one individual:
suppx := {i ∈ A : xi > 0}. (2)
We say that x is an interior point of its support if ∃ ε > 0
(non-depending on the population size) such that xi 6= 0 =⇒
xi > ε. The definition of interior points becomes non-trivial
when n → ∞. In fact, types with a negligible fraction of
players using an action are not interior of their support.
We remark that the size of the space of types X (n) grows
only polynomially in n, making the analysis on the space of
type more tractable, as we will see in the following of this
work. However, in general the type of the system x is not a
sufficient observable to represent the state of the system and
to study its evolution, since it does not capture the topological
structure of the network of interaction.
We can now introduce population games. For this class
of games, the reward of any player playing action i ∈ A
depends only on the type of the system. We denote it as
ri(x). Let r : X → R
A be a Lipschitz-continuous reward
vector function, whose entry ri(x) represents the reward
received by any player playing action i ∈ A when the type
of the system is x. We can naturally define the set of NE of
the (continuous) population game as
N := {x ∈ X : xi > 0 =⇒ ri(x) ≥ rj(x), ∀j ∈ A} , (3)
and its set of ESS as
S := {x ∈ X : ∃ ε > 0, ∀ y ∈ X r {x} :
||x− y|| < ε =⇒ (x− y)T r(y) < 0}.
(4)
In plain words, NE are configurations where no one of the
players could have an increase of the reward by flipping
his/her action (while the other players do not change their
action). ESS are configurations such that, if a small fraction
of “mutant” players changes their action, the reward of the
mutants is less than the one of the other players. From the
literature, S ⊆ N [18], which comes straightforward from
our insights on the two definitions.
Given a subset of actions B ⊆ A, these two definitions
can be naturally adapted to the game restricted to B by
considering configurations with suppx = suppy = B and
changing each occurrence of A to B.
In this work, we will stick our analysis to the case of
potential games [19], i.e., when it exists a potential function
Φ : X → R, that is continuous on the simplex X , continu-
ously differentiable in its interior, with gradient extendable
by continuity to its boundary ∂X , such that ∀ i, j ∈ A and
∀x ∈ X
rj(x)− ri(x) =
∂
∂xj
Φ(x) −
∂
∂xi
Φ(x). (5)
If a game is potential, then NE are critical points of Φ
[20], while isolated local maxima of Φ form the set S [14].
The same two relationships hold between critical points of
Φ restricted to B and the equilibria of the restricted game.
Example 1 (Congestion games): An important class of
potential games are congestion games [19], [21]. In their
simplest formulation, we suppose that the reward of agents
playing action i ∈ A only depends on xi. Therefore, the
reward vector functions have the form ri(x) = ri(xi), and
Φ(x) =
∑
i∈A
Ψi(xi), (6)
is a potential of the game, where Ψi is an anti-derivative of
ri. If the functions ri, i ∈ A, are monotone decreasing (e.g.,
negative rewards representing costs for the use of resources),
the potential Φ(x) is concave and has a global maximum x¯,
that is the only NE of the game and it is also ESS.
III. STOCHASTIC IMITATION DYNAMICS
Having defined the game, we introduce here the family
of learning dynamics the players adopt in order to improve
their reward. In this paper, we consider imitation dynamics,
arising when individuals modify their actions in response
to pairwise interactions [3], [16]. When two players meet,
they can discuss about the action they are playing and the
corresponding rewards. Then, depending on the difference
between the two rewards and possibly other factors, a player
either keeps playing the same action, or updates his/her
action to the one of the contacted individual.
Each player is identified by a node on a graph G = (V , E),
where the set of links E represents the network of interactions
between players, in the sense that the presence of the link
(u, v) has to be interpreted as the possibility of a contact
between player u and player v. Given a player u ∈ V , we
define the set of player with whom u can interact as the
neighbors of u, that are the players that can influence the
action played by u.
The update mechanism acts as follows. Each node is
equipped with an independent Poisson clock with rate λ.
When the clock associated with player u clicks, the node
gets activated, contacts a randomly chosen neighbor v, and
updates his/her action according to the following probabilis-
tic law. When a player u that plays action i contacts a
player v that uses action j, then u updates his/her action
to j with a probability that depends only on the two actions
i and j and on their difference in reward. In formula, we
call this probability fij(x), where, ∀ i, j ∈ A, the function
fij : R
A → (0, 1) is Lipschitz-continuous on X such that
sgn (fij(x)− fji(x)) = sgn (rj(x) − ri(x)) , ∀x ∈ X . (7)
In plain words, if the reward for playing action j is
greater than the one for playing i, then the probability that a
player updates his/her action from i to j is greater than the
probability that a player flips its state from j to i. Moreover,
the probability that a player changes its action and copies the
action of the contacted player is always greater than 0. We
present here two relevant examples of imitation dynamics.
Example 2 (Replicator equation): If we let fij(x) ∝
rj(x), ∀ i, j ∈ A , the imitation dynamics reduces to the
replicator equation [22], [23], [24]. Hence, imitation dynam-
ics encompass and generalize the replicator equation.
Example 3: A very general family of imitation dynamics
can be defined using the following probabilities
fij(x) =
1
2
+
1
π
arctan(Kij(rj(x)− ri(x))) , (8)
for i, j ∈ A, where Ki,j > 0.
In this work we will consider the fully mixed case, i.e.,
when the graph G is a complete graph (with self-loops).
Under this hypothesis, the neighbors of each player coincides
with the whole set of nodes. In this case, the probability
that a generic player u contacts someone that plays action
i ∈ A is proportional to the fraction of players playing
action i all over the population, i.e., xi. Therefore, under
this assumption, the whole state of the system is represented
through the type of the system, instead of its configuration.
Let us consider the m-dimensional process X(t) on X (n),
with t ∈ R+, following the time evolution of the type of
the system. This stochastic process induced by the imitation
dynamics is a Markov jump process, since the state updates
are governed by independent Poisson clocks and the copying
probabilities depend only on the type. The admissible transi-
tions of the process are those in which one component j of
the type is increased by 1/n and another one i is decreased
by the same quantity, as an effect of an agent that changes
its action from i to j. We denote by λ
(n)
ij the rate associated
with this transition. This rate can be computed as follows.
Since a fraction xi of players play action i, the activation
rate of a player using action i is λ · nxi. We multiply this
rate by the probability that the contacted player uses action
j, that is xj , and, then, by the copying probability fij(x).
Therefore, we finally obtain, ∀ i, j ∈ A,
λ
(n)
ij (x) = nλxixjfij(x). (9)
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(a) Reward functions
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Fig. 1: Reward functions r1 (blue solid) and r2 (red dashed)
and potential Φ of the game in Example 4. Empty circles
correspond to local minima, filled cycles to local maxima
(i.e., ESS), crosses to saddle points.
Remark 1: As already mentioned, many works [11], [12],
[13], [14], [15] study learning dynamics through determin-
istic processes x(t), which approximates the evolution of
the stochastic process X(t) arbitrarily well, for large-scale
populations and bounded times [25], [26]. This determin-
istic process is the solutions of the m-dimensional Cauchy
problem {
x˙ = λ diag(x)(FT (x)− F (x))x
x(0) = X(0),
(10)
where F is a matrix function defined, entry-wise, as
F (x)ij = fij(x), ∀ i, j ∈ A.
In [16] we analyzed such deterministic imitation dynam-
ics, proving that the solutions of (10) converge to NE of the
game restricted to the support of the initial condition. Being
the potential a global Lyapunov function [14], isolated local
maxima of Φ are asymptotically stable equilibria of (10). On
the contrary, NE that are isolated local minima and saddle
points are unstable.
However, the deterministic approach in Remark 1 fails in
grasping many interesting aspects of the imitation dynamics,
specifically concerning with their long-run behavior.
A first behavior that is not caught by the deterministic
models is the asymptotic behavior of the system. If fact,
X(t) admits a set of absorbing states, coinciding with the
pure configurations δ(i), and, being all the functions fij are
always non null, the system is eventually absorbed in a pure
configuration. However, as we will prove in the following,
this absorbing event takes an enormous time to occur.
On the contrary, a more subtle and relevant aspect of the
imitation dynamics that the deterministic approach fails to
grasp is the different nature of the NE (10) converges to. The
following example gives us an intuition of this issue, which
will be deeply discussed and analyzed in the next section.
Example 4: We consider a 2-action congestion game (Ex-
ample 1) with reward functions
r1(x1) = 9− (4x1 − 3) (4x1 − 1)
2 , r2(x2) = 9, (11)
resulting into the potential
Φ(x) = −16x41 +
80
3
x31 − 14x
2
1 + 3x1 + 9. (12)
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(a) X1(0) = 0.001, n = 2500
2,000 4,000
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
t
X1(t)
(b) X1(0) = 0.3, n = 2500
3,000 6,000 9,000
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
t
X1(t)
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Fig. 2: Trajectories of the stochastic imitation dynamics in
Example 3 for the game in Example 4 with λ = K12 =
K21 = 1, n = 2500 and n = 25000, respectively.
Figure 1 depicts the two reward functions and the potential.
The system can be reduced to a one-dimensional system,
since x2 = 1 − x1, allowing for a complete analysis of the
system. Critical points of the potential can be computed: they
are the two local minima coinciding with the pure configu-
rations δ(1) and δ(2), the saddle point in A = (1/4, 3/4),
and the global maximum in B = (3/4, 1/4). Therefore,
N = {A,B} and S = {B}. Without any loss in generality,
we consider the imitation dynamics presented in Example 3
and we notice that the deterministic approximation obtained
using (10) converges to A if x1(0) < 1/4, or to B otherwise.
From the Monte Carlo simulations of the stochastic pro-
cess in Fig. 2 (with λ = 1), we appreciate a different
behavior of the system close to the two equilibria: if the
system converges close to A, it spends there a (reasonably)
short amount of time, then it converges close to B. Once the
system is close to B, it spends there a very long time. In
fact, the absorbing event is not seen in the time-horizons of
our simulations.
From this example, we may conjecture that the NE reached
by the deterministic learning process can exhibit a different
behavior, depending whether they are ESS or not: if the NE
reached is so, then the process spends a very long time close
to it. On the contrary, if it is not ESS, the process exits from it
in a reasonable time, and converges close to another NE, until
it reaches an ESS. The next section is devoted to formalize
and prove this intuition, which is the main contribution of
this paper.
IV. LONG-RUN ANALYSIS
In this section, we tackle the analysis of the stochastic
imitation dynamics in terms of their long-run behavior.
Specifically, we consider large-scale networks, i.e., with n→
∞, and we show that the process spends most of its time
close to S, before being absorbed in a pure configuration. For
the sake of simplicity, we make the following assumptions:
A1: the support of the initial condition is the whole A;
A2: the initial conditionX(0) is in the interior of its support;
A3: the potential Φ admits a finite number of critical points;
A4: the pure configurations are not ESS.
Remark 2: These assumptions are made to keep the pre-
sentation of the results and the readability of this section as
clear as possible. However, they could be removed at the
expense of having more complicated statements, notations,
and/or weaker results. Specifically, (A1) does not reduce the
generality of our results: we can naturally reformulate every
statement by considering the game restricted to the support
of the initial condition. Assumptions (A2) and (A3) can
be removed, obtaining slightly weaker results in terms of
expected values, instead of in terms of probability. Finally,
(A4) is not too restrictive: when not verified, it means that
some of the absorbing states of the system are ESSs and the
absorbing event may occur in a short time (since it coincide
with the convergence close to an ESS). In this case, our
statements can be generalized by asserting that either the
system is absorbed into one of these pure configurations that
are ESSs, or our results in the following hold.
At first, we recall that, according to Kurtz’s Theorem [25],
[26], for any T > 0, ∃CT > 0 such that
P
[
supt≤T ||X(t)− x(t)|| ≥ ε
]
≤ 2(m− 1)2e−CTnε
2
, (13)
where x(t) is the solution of (10), which converge to some
x¯ ∈ NE, as extensively studied in [16]. However, this result
is not sufficient to understand the long-run behavior of the
system, neither to guarantee convergence close to S. In fact,
i) Kurtz’s Theorem has no validity for T comparable with
the population size n (if T is function of n, CT may depend
on n too, and the probability in (13) may not converge to 0);
and ii) x(t) may converge to some NE that is not an ESS
(e.g., a saddle point of Φ).
Therefore, to understand the long-run behavior of the
system, we have to analyze the behavior of the stochastic
process X(t). Specifically, we first prove a pair of technical
lemmas: the first one deals with the time needed by the
process to decrease the potential, the second one with the
time required to exit the neighborhood of unstable critical
point of Φ (minima and saddle points). In order to improve
the readability of the paper, we state here the two lemmas
along with the new insight on the process they give. The
detailed proofs are presented in the Appendix.
Lemma 1: Let X(t) be an imitation dynamics with transi-
tion rates (9) and a potential Φ that satisfies (5). Let us focus
on the stochastic process Φ(t) = Φ(X(t)) and let X(t) such
that ||X(t) − x¯||∞ ≥ δ > 0, for any x¯ fixed point of (10)
and t ≥ 0. Then, ∀ ε > 0 ∃Cδ,Kδ > 0 such that
P
[
∃ t < eCδεn : Φ(t) < Φ(0)− ε
]
≤ e−Kδεn. (14)
Lemma 1 allows us to tie the behavior of the stochastic
process X(t) and the one of the associated deterministic
system of ODEs from (10), far beyond the finite time ranges
in which Kurtz’s Theorem can be applied. In fact, from
Lemma 1 we deduce that the asymptotically stable equilibria
of (10), are also meta-stable equilibria of the stochastic
imitation dynamics, since the process, when reached x¯ ∈ S
(that is a local maximum of Φ), needs an exponentially
long time in n to decrease the potential and move away
from x¯. However, the analysis of the stochastic imitation
dynamics is not complete: we still have to study the behavior
of the system close to critical points of Φ(x) that are not
local maxima, in order to guarantee X(t) to exit from their
neighborhood in a time negligible with respect to the one
spent close to S. The following result serves this purpose.
Lemma 2: Let X(t) be an imitation dynamics with transi-
tion rates (9) and a potential Φ that satisfies (5). Let us focus
on the stochastic process Φ(t) = Φ(X(t)) and let X(t) such
that ||X(t) − x¯|| → 0 as n → ∞, where x¯ is an unstable
critical point of the potential. Then, ∃ ε,Kε > 0, such that
P [∃ t ≤ Kεn lnn : Φ(t) ≥ Φ(x¯) + ε] ≥ 1−
1
lnN
. (15)
Given an imitation dynamics with initial condition X(0),
we define the absorbing time as
τ := min{t ∈ R+ : X(t) = δ(i), i ∈ A}, (16)
and, given γ > 0, we denote the fraction of time spent γ-
close to the ESSs of the game as
Tγ(t) :=
1
t
∫ t
0
1γ(X(s))ds, (17)
where
1γ(X(s)) :=
{
1 if ∃ x¯ ∈ S : ||X(s)− x¯|| < γ
0 else.
(18)
All our results can be summarized in the following theorem,
which is the main contribution of this paper.
Theorem 1: Let X(t) be an imitation dynamics with tran-
sition rates (9) and a potential Φ that satisfies (5). Then
∃C1, C2, C3 > 0, such that, with probability converging to
1 as n grows, the following holds:
i) τ ≥ eC1n; and
ii) Tγ(e
C2n) ≥ 1− e−C3n, ∀ γ > 0.
Proof: Let x(t) be the solution of (10) with initial
condition x(0). Results in [16] guarantee x(t) → x¯ ∈ N .
We distinguish two cases: 1) x¯ ∈ S, or 2) x¯ /∈ S.
1) For any δ′ > 0, let Tδ′ be the time such that ||x(t) −
x¯|| < δ′/2. Then, applying (13) with ε = δ′/2,
||X(Tδ′)− x¯|| < δ′ holds with probability exponentially
close to 1. Since x¯ is an isolated maximum of the
Lipshitz-continuity potential [20], it exists a neighbor-
hood of x¯ where Φ is strictly decreasing. Specifically,
∃ δ such that, chosen δ′ < δ, maxx:||x−x¯||∞=δ Φ(x) ≤
Φ(x¯)− ε and minx:||x−x¯||∞=δ′ Φ(x) ≥ Φ(x¯)− ε/2, for
some ε > 0. Hence, for X(t) to exit a δ neighborhood
of x¯, the potential should decrease by at least ε/2, while
||X(t) − x¯|| ≥ δ′/2. Lemma 1 bounds the probability
that this event occur before Tδ′+e
C2n, for some C2 > 0.
Then, i) comes straightforward, being τ ≥ eC2n, and
ii) is obtained ∀γ > 0, by substituting ε instead of
δ, if γ < δ, and by considering that the time spent
γ-close to x¯ is greater than the one spent δ-close to
it, otherwise. Finally, since Tδ′ does not depend on n,
Tδ′/e
C2n ≤ e−C3n, for some C3 > 0, as n grows.
2) x¯ is either a local minimum or a saddle point of Φ.
Similar to 1), after Tδ′ , ||X(t) − x¯|| < δ′/2. Then,
Lemma 2 guarantees that, after T˜x¯ = Kx¯′n lnn, for
some Kx¯′ > 0, Φ(t) ≥ Φ(x¯) + ε. Then, due to
the Lipshitz-continuity argument, ||x(t) − x¯|| ≥ δ, so
(10) yields convergence close to some x¯1. The core
observation is that, since the potential cannot decrease
along trajectories of (10), X(t) cannot visit the critical
point of Φ twice. Being the number of critical points
finite (A3), X(t) spends at most a time Kn lnn, for
some K ≥ 0 (given by the sum of all the times
spent close to non-ESSs), before entering the basin of
attraction of a local maximum. Then, follow 1).
Theorem 1 gives some interesting insights on the im-
itation dynamics, far beyond what can be deduced from
the deterministic approximation. In fact, our result allows
for performing an analysis of those phenomena that the
deterministic imitation dynamics do not catch. Specifically,
on the one hand, we give some bounds on the absorbing
time of the process, guaranteeing that this event is not seen
before an exponentially long time in the population size.
On the other hand, we ensure that it spends most of the
time before the absorbing event close to evolutionary stable
NE of the (continuous) population game, that are the local
maxima of the potential Φ. Both these results hold true with
probability converging to 1 as the population size grows.
We notice that these results are perfectly consistent with the
conjectures deduced from the simulations in Fig 2.
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
At this stage, it is natural to wonder what happens in
situations where the players interact on a complex com-
munication network, which is not a complete graph. The
answer to this question is of course nontrivial: the presence
of clustered communities or non-symmetric connections may
influence the dynamics of the system, deviating it from the
convergence close to S, seen for the complete graph.
However, in this section, we show that there are at least
some relevant cases in which the behavior predicted for a
complete graph in Theorem 1 seems to coincide with the
one on non-complete topologies. In Fig. 3, we present some
simulations of the imitation dynamics proposed in Example
3 with the potential in Example 4 on some relevant network
of interactions. Specifically, in (a) and (b) we consider an
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) random graph, where each couple of
individuals are connected with probability p (independently
on the others); in (c) and (d), instead, we simulate the system
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Fig. 3: Sample paths of the stochastic imitation dynamics in
Example 3 for the game in Example 4 with λ = K12 =
K21 = 1 on an ER with p = 0.02 and n = 5000, and on a
square lattice with n = 5041.
on a regular square lattice. The behavior of this system
in both cases is very similar to the one predicted for the
complete graph (as one can see by comparing Figs. 2 and
3), suggesting the possibility to extend our analytical results
to more general networks of interactions.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we extended our comprehension of imitation
dynamics, gaining new insight with respect to those that can
be obtained by analyzing their deterministic counterparts.
In particular, we studied the different behavior of NE,
depending on their evolutionary stability. Our main results,
formalized in Theorem 1, concern the long-run behavior of
the system under the imitation dynamics. Specifically, we
show that under some reasonable assumptions, the process
spends almost all the time close to the ESSs of the game,
for a time exponentially long time in the population size.
In future research, first we seek to extend our results
to more general cases. On the one hand, we would like
to generalize the formulation of Theorem 1, removing the
assumptions made in this work. On the other hand, inspired
by the promising preliminary numerical results in Section V,
we are extending our analytical finding to the case in which
players interact on a non-complete network of connections.
We also plan to study cases in which the learning process
interacts with the dynamics of a physical system [27].
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APPENDIX
Lemma 1: Let us consider X(t) with transition rates (9)
and a potential Φ that satisfies (5). Let us focus on the
stochastic process Φ(t) = Φ(X(t)) and let X(t) such that
||X(t) − x¯||∞ ≥ δ > 0, for any x¯ fixed point of (10) and
t ≥ 0. Then, ∀ ε > 0 ∃Cδ,Kδ > 0 such that
P
[
∃ t < eCδεn : Φ(t) < Φ(0)− ε
]
≤ e−Kδεn. (19)
Proof: Without any loss in generality, we re-scale λ =
1. Let us focus on the stochastic process Φ(t) and the effect
of each transition of the process X(t) on it. At first, we
notice that, when X(t) = x, the process Φ(t) increases or
decreases with rates that can be explicitly written as functions
of x. Notably, called q±(x) the increasing and the decreasing
rate of Φ(t) when X(t) = x, respectively, we have
q−(x) = n
∑
i∈A
∑
j|rj<ri
xixjfij(x), (20)
and
q+(x) = n
∑
i∈A
∑
j|rj>ri
xixjfij(x). (21)
Due to (7), it is straightforward that q+(x) ≥ q−(x), and
that the strict inequality holds for all the states x that are not
fixed points of (10). Moreover, Lipschitz-continuity of fijs
guarantees that ∃ δ′ > 0 such that, ∀x ∈ X with ||x−x¯||∞ >
δ, it holds
q+(x) ≥ (1 + δ′)q−(x). (22)
Named C the maximum possible reward, i.e., C =
maxx,i ri(x). Then, as a straightforward consequence, for
each jump of the Markov processX(t) in the direction of the
decreasing potential, the potential decreases by no more than
C/n, according to(5). We recall that each change of potential
is associated with a player that updates its action from some
i ∈ A to some j ∈ A with j 6= i, and all the possible pairs
of distinct actions (i, j) are exactly m(m− 1)/2.
Hence, in order for the process Φ(t) to go beyond Φ(0)−
ε, at least εn/C steps in the direction of the decreasing
potential have to be present. As a consequence, there must
be at least a pair of actions (i, j) such that the number of
steps in the direction of the decreasing potential due to action
swapping from i to j (or vice versa) is greater than the one
in the opposite direction by at least 2εn/Cm(m− 1).
The rest of the proof is focused on bounding the prob-
ability that this event before an exponentially large time is
passed. Fixed a pair of actions (i, j), we name Eij(T ) the
event: the number of steps in the direction of the decreasing
potential, consequence of action flipping from i to j (or
vice versa) is greater than the one in the direction of the
increasing potential at least by a quantity 2εn/Cm(m− 1)
within a time-horizon of duration T . The goal of the main
part of this proof consists in demonstrating that ∃Cε > 0
such that
P
[
Eij(n
−1 exp{Cδ′εn})
]
≤ 10 exp{−Cδ′εn}, (23)
and this proof is performed tailoring the argument used in
[28] to the specific features of this model.
From now on, to improve the readability, we call jump an
event in which a player flips his/her action from i to j or
vice versa. Let Λ(t) be the number of jumps the processX(t)
does in the time interval [0, t]. Λ(t) is a time-varying Poisson
process, naturally dominated by an homogeneous Poisson
process with rate µ = n (that is the rate of the Poisson
process governing the player’s activation, not regarding on
the action they play).
Let us denote by Φ+k the potential of the process after its
k-th jump and let us define
A(t) := {k = 1, . . . ,Λ(t) : Φ+k−1 ∈ (Φ(0)−ε,Φ(0)]}. (24)
Let ξk be the Bernoulli random variable that assumes value
1 if the k-th jump increases the potential. It holds
P(ξk = 1) =
q+(x)
q+(x) + q−(x)
≥
1 + δ′
2 + δ′
=: p. (25)
Now, we bound the number of jumps occurring during a
fixed time range T , with
P[Λ(T ) > KµT ] ≤
+∞∑
k=⌈KµT+1⌉
e−µT
(µT )k
k!
≤
(µT )⌈KµT⌉
⌈KµT ⌉!
≤
( e
K
)⌈KµT⌉
.
(26)
For any K > e, (26) guarantees an exponential decay of the
probability of having more than KµT jumps during a time
range T.
We now estimate P[Eij(T )], by conditioning on the
number of jumps in the time range T , and splitting the
summation into two parts, where each one can be bounded
using different techniques. To simplify the notation we define
P[EL] := P[Eij(T ) |Λ(T ) = L], (27)
and we estimate as follows:
P[Eij(T )] =
∑
L∈N
P
[
EL
]
· P[Λ(T ) = L]
≤
3µT∑
L=1
P
[
EL
]
· P[Λ(T ) = L]
+P[Λ(T ) > 3µT ].
(28)
The second term of the right hand side of (28) can be
bounded using (26). Therefore, we focus on estimating the
first one: the probability of having a sequence of l ≥
2εn/Cm(m − 1) consecutive jumps while the potential is
in (Φ(0)− ε,Φ(0)], for which the number of overall jumps
in the direction of decreasing potential exceeds the ones in
the other direction at least by 2εn/Cm(m − 1). Using the
union bound, we have
P
[
EL
]
≤
L∑
k=1
L∑
l=⌈εn⌉
P[El], (29)
where the event El is defined as
El =
l−1⋂
i=0
{k + i ∈ A(t)}
⋂{ l−1∑
i=0
ξk+i ≤
l
2
−
εn
Cm(m− 1)
}
(30)
Using Chernoff bound, we estimate
P [El] ≤ exp
{
−lp
(
2p− 1
2p
)2}
≤ exp
{
−
(2p− 1)2l
8p
}
≤ exp
{
−
δ2l
8(1 + δ)(2 + δ)
}
.
(31)
Combining (29) and (31), we bound
P
[
EL
]
≤
L∑
k=1
L∑
l=⌈εn⌉
P[El]
≤
L∑
k=1
L∑
l=⌈εn⌉
exp
{
−
δ2l
8(1 + δ)(2 + δ)
}
≤ L2 exp
{
−ε
δ2
8(1 + δ)(2 + δ)
n
}
.
(32)
Being the bound in (32) monotonically increasing in L, we
can conclude
3µT∑
L=1
P
[
EL
]
P[Λ(T ) = L]
≤ P
[
E3µT
] 3µT∑
L=1
P[Λ(T ) = L]
≤ (3µT )2 exp
{
−ε
δ2
8(1 + δ)(2 + δ)
n
}
.
(33)
We bound the second term of (28) using (26) with K = 3,
being the smallest integer number greater than e, obtaining
the following exponential decay:
P[Eij(T )] ≤ (3µT )
2 exp
{
δ2εn
8(1 + δ)(2 + δ)
}
+
(e
3
)⌈3µT⌉
.
(34)
Fix now ǫ > 0 and put
T =
1
n
exp
{
δ2
24(1 + δ)(2 + δ)
εn
}
. (35)
Using the fact that (e/3)x < x−2 for all x > 0, we finally
prove the validity of (23) with Cδ′ equal to the expression
multiplying εn in the argument of (35).
Finally, using the union bound on all them(m−1)/2 pairs
of actions, we estimate
P
[
∃ t ≤ n−1 exp{Cδ′εn} : Φ(t) ≤ Φ(0)− ε
]
≤
∑
(i,j)
P
[
Eij(n
−1 exp{Cδ′εn})
]
≤
∑
(i,j)
10 exp{−Cδ′εn}
≤ 5m(m− 1) exp{−Cδ′εn}.
(36)
Since δ′ is defined in (22), depending on δ, Cδ′ is ultimately
function of δ. We conclude the proof by noticing that (36)
can be re-formulated as (19), for any Cδ,Kδ > 0 such that
Cδ ≤ C
′
δ −
lnn
εn
, Kδ ≤ C
′
δ −
ln(5m(m− 1))
εn
, (37)
which has solutions if n is sufficiently large.
Lemma 2: Let us consider X(t) with transition rates (9)
and a potential Φ that satisfies (5). Let us focus on the
stochastic process Φ(t) = Φ(X(t)) and let X(t) such that
||X(t)− x¯|| → 0 as n→∞, where x¯ is an unstable critical
point of the potential. Then, ∃ ε > 0 such that, for Kε > 0
it holds
P [∃ t ≤ Kεn lnn : Φ(t) ≥ Φ(x¯) + ε] ≥ 1−
1
lnN
. (38)
Proof: Without any loss in generality, we re-scale λ =
1. The proof is straightforward when x¯ is a local minimum
of Φ. We adopt the same formalism used in the proof of
Lemma 1. We notice that q+(x) ≥ q−(x), but (22) is not
satisfied as far as x is close to x¯. Being x¯ a local minimum of
Φ(x), the Lipshitz-continuity argument guarantees that ∃ δ >
0 such that minx:||x−x¯||=δΦ(x) = Φ(x¯)+ ε, for some ε > 0.
We notice that δn jumps in the direction of the increasing
potential guarantee to reach Φ(x¯) + ε. The probability of
having a jump in the direction of the increasing potential is
greater than or equal to 1/2, which immediately yields the
process Φ(t) to stochastically dominate a (fair) voter model
P (t) with the same jumps and copying probability 1/2. The
expected time needed for P (t) to reach Φ(x¯) + ε is Kεn,
for some Kε > 0 only depending on δ and, ultimately, on ε
[29]. Finally, Markov inequality yields the proof.
If x¯ is a saddle point, the presence of a stable manifold
poses some technical issues to be taken into account. Lemma
1, however, guarantees that the process can not exit from
the neighborhood of x¯ along a stable manifold (along which
the potential decreases), before an exponentially long time
in n. Then, since all transitions can occur with non-null
probability, at each activation of a node the system has a
non-zero probability to deviate from a stable manifold, so
after n transitions the probability of observing at least a
deviation is exponentially close to 1. Considering that, with
probability converging exponentially close to 1 we have at
least n transitions in a time-horizon of duration lnn, we
conclude that in a time-window of duration lnn the process
deviates from a stable manifold, with probability converging
exponentially to 1. Finally, the result proved above for the
exit time from a minimum can be directly applied when the
process is not on a stable manifold of the saddle point.
